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precluded military operations on an important scale; that the attention of the Soviets was riveted on China; and that Russia was content to play a waiting game to see what would emerge from the contemporary friction between Turkey and Britain over the Mosul dispute. All these are plausible theories in their way, but none of them appears to be wholly convincing. Indeed, it is open to question whether any or all of these reasons would have prevented the Soviets from seizing such a gratuitous opportunity for imposing, by military action, their will upon the northern provinces of Afghanistan had this, in fact, been their settled policy at that time. This line of reasoning can be carried even further, in that indications are not lacking that the Russians actually used the Urta Tagai settle- ment to induce the Afghans to agree to the Neutrality Pact of 1926. If paper engage- ments signify anything, this pact was designed primarily to promote peace and settled conditions in adjoining provinces of Russia and Afghanistan. Since, however, the Afghans stood to gain more by this Pact than did its originators, it is difficult to attribute any but constructive motives to Russia, whose anxiety to conclude the engagement was emphasised by her willingness to accept the political rebuff which the Afghan success in the Urta Tagai settlement entailed.
If the above reasoning is accepted, it seems clear that Russian policy in Afghanistan may well be constructive, although such a policy, at best, rests on uncertain foundations. Any unforeseen frontier incident or false move which ignored Afghan sovereignty might, at any time, precipitate a declaration of war by Afghanistan, and even a defensive move of military forces across the Afghan border would violate Afghan integrity, and might be held to provide Great Britain with a definite casus belli as endangering the safety of India. Russia would, therefore, obviously gain many advantages by pursuing a policy of gradual domination which Great Britain could not legitimately challenge so long as Afghanistan
subscribed to it.
From the foregoing analysis it is difficult to believe that Russian policy has any other aim than the attainment of a position of political control in Afghanistan.
It is at present unlikely to take the form of a military invasion of that country, and the method to be followed is more likely to be that of peaceful penetration. This may be effected either by the preliminary absorption of the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan into the Turkoman Republics or by the Russians gaining a gradual control over the whole country. But, whichever of these two methods the Russians may see fit to employ, there is always the danger that some untoward frontier incident, or some premature declaration of the Soviet's real intentions may force the hand of the Amir and so precipitate a war.
CONCLUSION.
9. To sum up :-If the deductions which I have drawn from Russian methods in China are correct, it would seem that the Soviets have followed a definite strategical policy in that country in which constructive and destructive elements have been cunningly blended so as to extend Soviet control and to strike at British interests. Steps were first taken to fashion portions of China adjacent to Russia into a protective buffer which could, if required, be developed into a good jumping-off place either for subversive activities or for military aggression in China proper. As a further step, existing chaos on the far side of the buffer was aggravated as a means to destroy British trade interests and prestige. Finally, the Soviet advisers obviously hope to be able to utilize their political influence over Nationalist China to create embarrassing diversions in India, through Burma, Sinkiang and Tibet, while the main approach to India is being developed from the north-west. It is incidentally to be observed that, up to date, the Russians have obtained a considerable measure of success in China without employing a single Red soldier except in an instructional or aucillary capacity.
As regards Afghanistan, without losing sight of the undoubted importance of the Russian military menace to Afghanistan and to our position in India, it is suggested that the Soviets are trying, at any rate as a preliminary, to employ the same non-military inethods as those which have proved so successful in China. In this case their constructive activities in Afghanistan which have proved somewhat baffling to us in the past, admit of this possible explanation, that Afghanistan is not destined for disintegration, but, like Sinkiang or Outer Mongolia, is to be developed as a protective buffer and advanced base for disruptive activities in India. Should this policy, together with that in China, succeed, the Russian ring round India would be virtually complete without the necessity of having to fight for this object. In any analysis of this kind, however, one must never lose sight of the fact that such a policy, however carefully handled, is always liable to complete breakdown at short notice owing to minor frontier incidents, to Afghan sensitiveness to foreign interference, or to other causes. Should such a breakdown occur, it is obvious that the Russians would then be obliged to risk the inevitable British challenge and to occupy forcibly the northern provinces of Afghanistan as a preliminary step to securing, by military means, the control of the remainder of that country.
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